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How do elites signal their superior social 
position via consumption of, and participa-
tion in, particular types of culture? This ques-
tion has long been central to sociological 
thought (Elias 1939; Goffman 1959; Simmel 
1957; Weber 1915). Two perspectives domi-
nate: (1) social emulation models posit that 
elites achieve distinction by continually 
developing ever-more expensive and elabo-
rate tastes to guard against the imitation strat-
egies of aspirational outsiders (Simmel 1957; 
Veblen 1899), whilst (2) (mis)recognition 
models posit that distinction pivots on elites’ 
ability to impose as legitimate their own arbi-
trary categories of cultural perception and 
appreciation (Bourdieu 1984). Either way, the 
idea that elites use culture to mark themselves 
off from lower social classes is a foundational 
assumption motivating scholarship on cul-
tural consumption. Yet despite this theoretical 
importance, the empirical basis for such 
claims lags behind. In this article, we identify, 
and attempt to address, three problems in the 
voluminous literature on elite distinction.
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Abstract
How do elites signal their superior social position via the consumption of culture? We address 
this question by drawing on 120 years of “recreations” data (N = 71,393) contained within 
Who’s Who, a unique catalogue of the British elite. Our results reveal three historical phases 
of elite cultural distinction: first, a mode of aristocratic practice forged around the leisure 
possibilities afforded by landed estates, which waned significantly in the late-nineteenth 
century; second, a highbrow mode dominated by the fine arts, which increased sharply in the 
early-twentieth century before gently receding in the most recent birth cohorts; and, third, a 
contemporary mode characterized by the blending of highbrow pursuits with everyday forms 
of cultural participation, such as spending time with family, friends, and pets. These shifts 
reveal changes not only in the contents of elite culture but also in the nature of elite distinction, 
in particular, (1) how the applicability of emulation and (mis)recognition theories has changed 
over time, and (2) the emergence of a contemporary mode that publicly emphasizes everyday 
cultural practice (to accentuate ordinariness, authenticity, and cultural connection) while 
retaining many tastes that continue to be (mis)recognized as legitimate.
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First, conceptualizations of elites fre-
quently lack precision. Elites are numerically 
too small to show up on the sample surveys 
normally used to research cultural consump-
tion and therefore, when invoked, are typi-
cally represented by broad proxies such as 
big-class occupational groups or advanced 
education (Coulangeon and Lemel 2007; 
Friedman and Laurison 2019; Peterson and 
Simkus 1992; Savage et al. 2015). Put simply, 
we know of no large-scale quantitative inves-
tigation of specifically elite cultural taste ever 
conducted in sociology.1 Second, proponents 
of different theories of elite distinction assume 
these generalize across time and space. Yet 
the empirical observations from which con-
cepts such as emulation and (mis)recognition 
emerged are rooted in snapshots of particular 
national contexts at particular moments in 
time (Daloz 2009). To meaningfully unpack 
the historical specificities of such theories, we 
therefore require a longitudinal lens that can 
examine how elite culture changes over time. 
Finally, work on elite distinction faces meth-
odological challenges. In particular, the vast 
majority of empirical analysis proceeds from 
survey or interview data where people report 
their cultural preferences anonymously. Yet, 
as Daloz (2009) notes, a fundamental compo-
nent of elite distinction is “display”—the 
presentation of one’s cultural self in a public 
or interactional setting. This micro-political 
dimension is difficult to discern using con-
ventional methodological tools.
We address each of these problems by 
drawing on a novel data source—the cultural 
“recreations” expressed by entrants within 
Who’s Who, an unrivaled catalogue of the Brit-
ish elite. Who’s Who documents a more precise 
elite, based on a selection of the .05 percent of 
the UK population that occupy the highest, 
most influential, and most prestigious occupa-
tional positions. We also have access to the 
publication’s entire historical database, which 
provides data on the cultural preferences of 
around 70,000 entrants born between 1830 and 
1969. Finally, as Who’s Who is a public docu-
ment, these data provide unique insights into 
how elites present their cultural selves pub-
licly; not necessarily what they actually “do” 
culturally but how they deploy their tastes in 
social life to signal their position.
Our analysis begins by identifying a mode 
of aristocratic elite culture, dominant in the 
late-nineteenth century, that was forged around 
the leisure possibilities afforded by landed 
estates (e.g., shooting, hunting, horse riding, 
polo, sailing). Here elites achieved distinction 
via the emulation of lower yet aspirational 
social groups, who largely deferred to their 
authority as inherent cultural paragons. We 
then show how this mode was threatened at 
the turn of the twentieth century. “Nouveau 
riche” industrialists began to buy their way 
into high society, and existing aristocratic 
elites, battling economic upheaval, were una-
ble to guard against this pecuniary emulation. 
Next, we show how a new generation of 
elites—influenced in particular by the Blooms-
bury intellectual collective—adapted to this 
threat. Positioning itself against the philistin-
ism of aristocratic modes, this new cohort 
championed a set of emerging “high” cultural 
forms (e.g., theater, ballet, classical music, 
abstract art) that went on to define elite culture 
in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. This new 
highbrow mode was successful in delivering 
distinction, albeit via a different mechanism. 
Rather than relying on an ascribed cultural 
legitimacy, as in the emulation model, high-
brow elites instead focused on generating a 
widespread (mis)recognition, via the state and 
allied institutions such as the BBC, of the 
inherent value of their own tastes and recrea-
tions. Again, though, this mode of elite culture 
was eventually questioned. Beginning in the 
1950s, the supremacy of highbrow culture 
was threatened by shifts within the art-world 
that initially challenged the highbrow aes-
thetic and later legitimized certain popular 
cultural forms; generational value change that 
precipitated a decline in snobbery and defer-
ence (to elites); and the emergence of a mana-
gerial culture where access to a broad cultural 
repertoire functioned as a key resource.
The final part of our analysis explains how 
once again elites adapted to these threats, diver-
sifying their cultural profiles and increasingly 
blending highbrow (and some aristocratic) rec-
reations with popular tastes and a range of 
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everyday practices, such as spending time with 
family, friends, and pets. We interpret this con-
temporary mode as pursuing dual aims. First, it 
continues to be distinction-seeking, with popu-
lar tastes still tilting toward more legitimate 
artists. However, the growing expression of 
everyday recreations, we argue, also signals 
something beyond distinction, and peculiar to 
the particular moral threats facing contempo-
rary elites. As elites pull away economically, 
they face increasing suspicion from wider pub-
lics that they lack prosocial motives and, in 
turn, authenticity and moral character. The pub-
lic expression of such “ordinary” everyday 
practices, therefore, with their intrinsic rather 
than extrinsic reward association, acts as a way 
to plug this authenticity-insecurity.
Our analysis not only reveals important 
changes in the contents of elite culture but 
also shows (1) how the applicability of emu-
lation and (mis)recognition models of elite 
distinction has changed over time, and (2) the 
emergence of a contemporary mode of ordi-
nary elite distinction that publicly emphasizes 
everyday cultural practice (to accentuate ordi-
nariness, authenticity, and cultural connec-
tion) while retaining many tastes that continue 
to be (mis)recognized as legitimate.
THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN 
UNDERSTANDING ELITE 
DISTINCTION
Emulation versus Misrecognition
Elite distinction, “the necessity for dominant 
social groups to display cultural signs of 
superiority to signal their upper social posi-
tion” (Daloz 2009:28), is a foundational con-
cern in the sociology of culture and taste. 
Many major theorists have addressed the 
issue in some form, ranging from a focus on 
conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1899) to 
fashion (Simmel 1957), court society (Elias 
1939), the presentation of self (Goffman 
1959), social closure (Weber 1915), and taste 
(Bourdieu 1984).
Two broad theoretical models dominate the 
conversation. The first, evident in the early 
sociological theorizing of Tarde (1903), 
Simmel (1957), and particularly Veblen 
(1899), centers on the role of social emulation. 
This is premised on the idea that people gener-
ally seek to imitate others socially superior to 
themselves by adopting their cultural tastes 
and recreations. In response, elites engage in a 
process of what Veblen called “invidious dis-
tinction,” differentiating themselves by con-
tinually developing ever-more expensive and 
elaborate tastes. This establishes respectability 
within their own milieu and guards their posi-
tion from the “pecuniary emulation” of lower, 
yet aspirational, social classes. At the same 
time, emulation theorists also point to the lim-
its of this dynamic. Key to this is the scarcity 
of elite recreations, which traditionally carry 
strong economic barriers to entry. But, as 
Tarde and Simmel point out, there are also 
cultural barriers to entry, and attempts to 
mimic elites are often categorized as crude. 
Simmel (1957), for example, argued that as 
fashion trends “trickle down” to less advan-
taged groups they are often “vulgarized” and 
lose their ability to signal eliteness.2 An exem-
plar of this, discussed in multiple empirical 
contexts, is the bind experienced by the “nou-
veau riche.” Although these upwardly mobile 
individuals may have the economic capital to 
adopt elite culture, they continually reveal 
their social origins by the “mistakes” they 
make in their execution of taste, or the insecu-
rity of their conduct (Harvey and Maclean 
2008; Needell 1987; Sampson 1994).
The second model of elite distinction, and 
significantly more influential in contempo-
rary sociology, centers on the role of 
(mis)recognition (Bourdieu 1984). Here 
socially subordinate groups do not so much 
emulate elites’ culture as misrecognize their 
categories of cultural appreciation as legiti-
mate. It is thus not that elites themselves are 
considered inherent cultural paragons, as in 
the emulation model; rather, they have the 
ability to generate widespread belief in the 
inherent value of their own tastes and recrea-
tions. This is achieved, according to Bourdieu 
(1984, 1993), by elites occupying pivotal 
positions in society that allow them to estab-
lish and impose the legitimacy of certain 
forms of culture (Accominotti et al. 2018; 
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DiMaggio 1982; Khan 2012b). Two “agents 
of legitimation” are particularly important: 
the state, which plays a central role in conse-
crating culture via funding and subsidy but 
also actively embeds and canonizes certain 
cultural items in educational curricula, and 
cultural intermediaries, that is, tastemakers in 
the media, nonprofit sector, and cultural 
industries who generate belief in the value 
and prestige of certain cultural goods 
(English 2008; Purhonen et al. 2018). In this 
(mis)recognition model, then, elites have the 
resources at their disposal to imbue their own 
cultural preferences with widespread legiti-
macy that can then be used by themselves, 
and dominant social classes more generally, 
to demarcate themselves from other groups; 
elite tastes, in other words, become “widely-
held high-status cultural signals” that operate 
as a socially valuable form of cultural capital 
(Lamont and Lareau 1988:156).
There are important connections between 
these theoretical strands. Both position elites 
as arbiters of taste with hegemonic capacities, 
for example. Yet they are also different in 
terms of how they see elites realizing distinc-
tion from other social groups. For Veblen, the 
pursuit of elite cultural distinction is a fairly 
conscious and intentional process. Groups 
within a status hierarchy largely accept the 
ascribed origins of class division, and there-
fore distinction and emulation are both logi-
cal attempts to either maintain one’s position 
or achieve upward mobility. In contrast, 
Bourdieu (1988:783) argued that his concep-
tion of elite distinction is mediated by habitus 
and therefore not necessarily intentional or 
voluntaristic. Moreover, where emulation 
theory arguably rests on a deference to elites, 
whatever the contents of their culture, 
(mis)recognition instead emphasizes how 
elites mobilize—intentionally or not—a wide-
spread consensus around the intrinsic value of 
their particular tastes and recreations.
Complexities of Time and Space
Among the social theorists espousing these 
two models of elite distinction there has been 
a striking tendency toward generalization. As 
Daloz (2009) notes, there is a clear intention 
in the work of Veblen and Bourdieu, in par-
ticular, to offer theories that transcend time 
and space.
Yet a comparative analysis of elite litera-
ture suggests strong limitations to such 
claims. In terms of place, for example, studies 
across a number of national contexts have 
questioned the assumption that subordinate 
groups necessarily imitate the culture of elites 
(Weatherill 1996). In France, for example, 
during the ancien régime, Royon (2002; cited 
in Daloz 2009) argues that the provincial aris-
tocracy accepted that they would never have 
the financial wealth to mimic their peers in 
Versailles, so instead built a counter-model of 
cultural value situated in opposition to the 
decadence of the Court, emphasizing honor 
and moral purity. Similarly, Fleming and 
Roses (2007) show that, in the pursuit of cul-
tural uplift and antiracism, the Boston Black 
Brahmins carefully imitated the aesthetic sen-
sibilities of the city’s Anglo-American elites, 
while at the same time working to success-
fully introduce and normalize black artistry.
Other scholars point to the limitations of 
emulation and (mis)recognition models in 
capturing the historical development of elite 
culture, particularly in terms of how its cur-
rency may have shifted at different points or 
how its specific contents may have changed 
(Elias 1939). For example, Hanquinet, Roose, 
and Savage (2014) note that Bourdieu’s con-
cepts of (mis)recognition and cultural capital 
rest heavily on a particular modernist reading 
of highbrow aesthetics that is strongly connected 
to both the temporal period and the national 
context in which Bourdieu was writing—France 
in the 1960s.
Elites without Elitism:  
Enter the Omnivore?
In recent years, some scholars have even ques-
tioned whether elite distinction is still taking 
place at all. Central here are studies docu-
menting the rise of the elite cultural omnivore, 
who eschews a purely highbrow cultural pal-
ette and instead happily grazes on both high-
brow and popular forms of culture (Bennett 
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et al. 2009; Peterson and Kern 1996). Some 
interpret the coming of the omnivore as evi-
dence of (at least a partial) dissolution of 
symbolic boundaries, and a signal that elites 
no longer use culture to pursue distinction 
from lower-class groups (Bennett et al. 2009; 
Chan 2019; Erickson 1996; Warde, Wright, 
and Gayo-Cal 2007). Examining the social 
and political attitudes of omnivores, Chan 
(2019), for instance, finds empirical support 
for the argument that omnivorousness is asso-
ciated with tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and 
openness to new cultural styles.
Yet the significance of omnivorousness for 
debates about elite distinction is strongly con-
tested. In particular, two alternative interpre-
tations have emerged. The most developed of 
these counters that omnivorousness simply 
represents the evolution of elite distinction 
(based on (mis)recognition), first via the 
selective consumption of consecrated or legit-
imate objects of popular culture (Bauman 
2007; Johnston and Baumann 2009; Kuipers 
2015; Regev 1994; Skeggs, Thumim, and 
Wood 2008) and, second, via the transposi-
tion of the aesthetic disposition to popular 
cultural forms (Flemmen, Jarness, and Rose-
lund 2017; Friedman 2014; Jarness 2015; 
Khan 2011; Lizardo and Skiles 2012).
Other analysts take a different tack, argu-
ing that omnivorousness does indicate a 
meaningful cultural shift, but one reflecting a 
wider “meritocratic turn” among elites who 
are increasingly keen to distance themselves 
from ascribed advantage and instead play up 
their “ordinariness” and “normality”—par-
ticularly in public settings (Jarness and Fried-
man 2017; Khan 2012a; Savage, Bagnall, and 
Longhurst 2001; Sherman 2018). Hahl, Zuck-
erman, and Kim (2017), for example, focus 
on the distinctive appeal of lowbrow tastes 
for elite omnivores. They argue that elites suf-
fer from an inherent insecurity about their 
moral legitimacy. To offset potential public 
concern that they are only motivated by 
extrinsic rewards such as status or power, 
elites develop preferences for what they per-
ceive to be more “authentic” low-status cul-
ture. Hahl and colleagues (2017:830) argue 
that as such culture is “produced without any 
awareness that it might impress elite audi-
ences as aesthetically sophisticated, elites 
generally assume it was produced in a spirit 
of disinterestedness with respect to highbrow 
standards, and thus in pursuit of intrinsic 
rewards rather than extrinsic rewards.” By 
adopting lowbrow tastes, contemporary elites 
thus attempt to mitigate their insecurity about 
perceived inauthenticity by borrowing, and 
profiting from, the perceived authenticity of 
lowbrow cultural forms (Reeves 2019).
Yet although multiple scholars have sug-
gested important rejoinders and critiques to 
theories of elite distinction, such studies con-
tain limited empirical scope. Historical work, 
for example, has relied largely on secondary 
sources (Annan 1991; Cannadine 1999), and 
the voluminous literature on the elite omni-
vore has been constrained by the fact that, 
numerically, elites are too small to show up 
on the kind of standard sample surveys nor-
mally used to measure cultural consumption 
(Savage and Williams 2008).
The reality, therefore, is that we actually 
know very little about the specific tastes of 
elites, how these may have changed over 
time, and the implications of potential shifts 
for theories of elite distinction. In this article, 
we draw on a unique data source—120 years 
of data contained within Who’s Who, an unri-
valed catalogue of the British elite—to move 
forward our understanding of these questions. 
Who’s Who not only contains biographical 
data on its entrants but also, crucially, asks 
them to input their “recreations,”3 providing 
us with data on the recreations of around 
70,000 entrants born between 1830 and 1969.
STABLE AND EXPANSIVE: THE 
CASE OF THE BRITISH ELITE
Before we move to our analysis, it is impor-
tant to explain both our choice of empirical 
case and our conceptualization of elites. Brit-
ain represents, we argue, a particularly rich 
site from which to study changes in elite cul-
ture. There are two reasons for this. First, 
elites in Britain were less bruised than other 
European elites by the political and economic 
upheavals of the past two centuries, and this 
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comparative stability lends itself to the kind of 
longitudinal analysis we undertake here (Can-
nadine 1999; Savage and Williams 2008). 
Britain’s aristocracy were certainly embattled 
by piecemeal reform and economic shocks in 
this period, but they did not face the kind of 
violent revolutions or wholesale expropriation 
of elite institutions that so profoundly altered 
elite culture in countries like France and Ger-
many (Cannadine 1999). Instead, the structure 
of the British elite—in terms of both its occu-
pational makeup and the schools and universi-
ties from which it has traditionally recruited 
its members—stayed remarkably stable over 
time (Reeves et al. 2017). The British case, 
then, provides a unique lens on elite cultural 
change that is far less muddied by abrupt rup-
tures in the ruling classes or by radical recon-
figurations of elite institutions.
Second, Britain’s colonial past means it 
has played an outsized role in the develop-
ment of elite culture in many other national 
contexts (Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 
2006). Colonial power, in particular, exerted a 
profound influence on the instantiation and 
development of elite culture throughout the 
Commonwealth (Potter 2012). And more 
widely, British elites have played a key role in 
the spread of arms-length public arts bodies 
(e.g., the Arts Council model in Australia, 
New Zealand, and Singapore), the prolifera-
tion of now global sports (e.g., cricket and 
rugby), and the dissemination of particular 
models of education (e.g., exclusive, fee-
paying schools) (Mangan 2013; McDevitt 
2004; O’Brien 2013). In this way, under-
standing changes in British elite culture offers 
important insights into how and why shifts in 
elite culture may have taken place elsewhere 
(Dooling 2005; Levine 1988).
WHO’S WHO: A 
CONSECRATED AND  
PUBLIC-FACING ELITE
Although elites are frequently invoked in cul-
tural consumption research, they are rarely 
properly defined and conceptualized. Across 
the literature, for example, they are variously 
operationalized as individuals in high-status 
occupations (Peterson and Simkus 1992), 
with advanced levels of education (Coulan-
geon 2017), or with superior stocks of “capi-
tal” (Savage et al. 2015). These definitions 
are broad, sometimes including up to 10 to 20 
percent of national populations, and therefore 
lack the specificity of definitions formulated 
by elite theorists (Scott 1991).
In this article, we draw on a tighter theo-
retical conception of elites that represents a 
powerful cross-fertilization of particularly 
“positional” but also “reputational” defini-
tions. Mosca (1939) famously argued that 
elites are best understood as “ruling minori-
ties,” empowered through relations of author-
ity and usually occupying formal top positions 
in organizational hierarchies (Scott 1997, 
2008; see also Mills 1956). Other scholars 
have argued that elites are more usefully iden-
tified in reputational terms as people thought 
to be powerful by those “in the know” (Hunter 
1953) or as individuals occupying some form 
of centrality in high-status networks 
(Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Munk 2013).
We base our analyses on Who’s Who, the 
leading biographical dictionary of “notewor-
thy and influential” people in the UK, which 
has been published in its current form every 
year since 1897. Who’s Who primarily docu-
ments a positional elite: 50 percent of entrants 
are included automatically upon reaching a 
prominent occupational position. These posi-
tions span multiple professional fields (see 
Part B of the online supplement for a list of 
automatic appointment positions). For exam-
ple, Members of Parliament, peers, judges, 
ambassadors, FTSE100 CEOs, Poet Laure-
ates, and Fellows of the British Academy are 
all included by virtue of their office.4
The other 50 percent of entrants are 
selected each year by a board of long-stand-
ing advisors. This part of the selection pro-
cess is shrouded in mystery and the subject of 
much media speculation (Paxman 2007). To 
address this, we conducted two interviews (in 
May 2017 and November 2019) with Katy 
McAdam, Head of Yearbooks at Bloomsbury 
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and coordinator of the selection process. 
McAdam explained that the selection process 
is not influenced by politicking and entries 
cannot be purchased:5 “It’s our job to reflect 
society, not to try and shape it.” McAdam 
underscored that advisors make decisions at a 
series of annual board meetings where they 
are provided with short biographies of a long-
list of potential entrants (compiled by Who’s 
Who editorial staff) who have recently 
achieved a noteworthy professional appoint-
ment or who enjoy sustained prestige, influ-
ence, or fame. Each potential entrant is 
discussed in turn by the board and inclusion is 
based on a majority vote. Individual board 
members have the power to veto any single 
decision if they wish. McAdam declined to 
provide further information about the board, 
such as their demographic makeup or average 
tenure, arguing that “the continued integrity 
of the publication depends on the total ano-
nymity of the advisory board.” This non-
automatic component adds an important 
“reputational” dimension to the selection pro-
cess, with Who’s Who making assessments of 
importance based on a person’s perceived 
impact on British society (Part C of the online 
supplement includes details of the changing 
occupational makeup of Who’s Who).
Although Who’s Who may make selections 
based on a mix of positional and reputational 
grounds, all entrants are then united by inclu-
sion itself, which acts as a marker of conse-
cration in its own right. Indeed, Who’s Who 
does not simply catalogue individuals who 
attain particularly prominent positions or rep-
utations, but it further adds to this recognition 
by publicly constructing them as important 
through their inclusion. In this way, Who’s 
Who plays a uniquely performative role in 
reflecting and actively constructing a national 
British elite that is widely recognized through-
out British society. This legitimacy has been 
demonstrated in a number of ways: the book 
has long been considered the most valid cata-
logue of the British elite among elite scholars 
(see, e.g., Griffiths, Miles, and Savage 2008; 
Heath 1981; Kelsall 1955; Kirby 2016; Miles 
and Savage 2012; Stanworth and Giddens 
1974), new entrants continue to be the subject 
of widespread national media attention (Fit-
zwilliam 2010; Paxman 2007), and the book’s 
title has passed into everyday parlance as a 
casual byword for eliteness.6
There are three additional reasons why 
Who’s Who is a particularly useful source for 
understanding elite culture. First, it is the only 
data source we know of that is both specifi-
cally focused on elites and provides data on 
cultural tastes. Second, the recreations data 
are unusual because they are based on a free-
text question, where entrants are free to input 
whatever they like. This means responses are 
not limited to the normal seven or eight for-
mal categories of taste or participation nor-
mally found on standard surveys and may 
include usually-neglected everyday forms of 
cultural participation (Miles and Gibson 
2017). Finally, Who’s Who is unique in that it 
is very much a public document. In this way, 
the expression of recreations within its pages 
does not necessarily indicate what elites actu-
ally do culturally. Instead, it is more powerful 
as an expression of how they perform their 
cultural selves, publicly, and especially to the 
other elites who most likely read the book 
(Reeves, Gilbert, and Holman 2015).
METHODS
In November 2016, after extensive discus-
sions with Oxford University Press and 
Bloomsbury Publishing—the two publishing 
companies producing Who’s Who—we suc-
cessfully brokered access to all data collected 
by the publication since it began including 
full biographical details in 1897.
Who’s Who contains two separate but con-
nected data sources: (1) Who’s Who and (2) 
Who Was Who. Who’s Who is the current 
directory of every individual included in the 
published version of the book. Over time its 
entrants have consistently represented 
approximately .05 percent of the UK popula-
tion (or 1 in every 2,000 people).7 When a 
person included in Who’s Who passes away, 
their record is transferred into Who Was Who. 
We combine these datasets and treat them as 
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one data source, referring to it collectively as 
Who’s Who. Our analysis focuses on the 
71,393 individuals8 who describe their recrea-
tions (for details of the changing demographic 
makeup of Who’s Who, see Part D of the 
online supplement).
We analyze the recreations9 data using two 
different methods. First, we used dictionary 
methods to identify the proportion of people 
born in a given cohort who reported participat-
ing in a particular activity by directly counting 
the number of times certain terms were 
reported. To do this, we began, inductively, by 
focusing on words used more than 100 times 
across all individuals. We then looked at the 
main trends among these commonly cited 
terms, identifying three large clusters of recre-
ations, or cultural modes (what we call “aristo-
cratic,” “highbrow,” and “ordinary”) that share 
similar trajectories across time and accord with 
historical and sociological literature on elite 
cultural consumption. As discussed in Part F of 
the online supplement, the vast majority of 
entrants used at least one of the key words 
coded in this analysis (for more information on 
our hand-coding procedure, see Part F of the 
online supplement).
However, there are several limitations to 
dictionary methods. First, although our analy-
sis covers a high proportion of all words used, 
it does not categorize every word used in 
entries. We may thus overlook patterns in the 
data that exist beyond our hand-coded catego-
ries. Second, dictionary methods may strug-
gle to reveal changes in entrants’ combination 
of recreations because they ignore the rela-
tionship between words. That is, by focusing 
on “shooting” we may fail to capture how this 
term is used in relation to other activities, 
such as “sailing” and “golf,” which together 
may represent a distinct mode of culture.
To address these issues, we use our second 
method—a semi-automated content analysis 
procedure (ReadMe)—to re-examine the 
trends in how Who’s Who entrants report their 
recreations over time (Hopkins and King 
2010). Here we initially hand-coded 600 
entries, marking whether respondents reported 
interests in our aristocratic, highbrow, 
or ordinary categories. We then recorded all 
possible combinations of these categories; for 
example, a respondent may blend highbrow 
activities (“the arts”) and the everyday 
(“spending time with my family”). Once 
completed, we plugged the hand-coded 
entries into a machine learning algorithm that 
then read the rest of the entries and calculated 
the proportion of entries (within a margin of 
error) in each single or combined category. 
We validated this method by testing how 
accurately it estimated our coding frame-
work. To do this, we hand-coded an addi-
tional 600 entries and then used the first set of 
hand-coded entries to predict the second set. 
Readme is very successful, predicting the 
right proportions to within a few percentage 
points of the hand-coded results. We then 
again used the first set of hand-coded entries 
to calculate the proportion of all entries in 
each category for entrants who turned 20 in a 
given period in Who’s Who (1850 to 1859, 
1860 to 1869, . . ., 1980 to 1989).
This supervised approach addresses some 
of the problems of dictionary methods, but it 
still proceeds analytically from the investiga-
tor’s own hand-coding of recreational catego-
ries. In Part G of the online supplement, we 
therefore use an unsupervised structural topic 
model to assess whether similar trends can be 
observed using a totally undirected approach. 
The advantage of this approach is that it 
means categories or topics emerge induc-
tively from the correlational structure of the 
data. Reassuringly, the unsupervised topic 
model mirrors closely the results reported in 
the next section (for more details, see Part G 
of the online supplement).
Finally, to provide a more granular analysis 
of elite musical taste, we combine Who’s Who 
with another unique historical data source—
the archive of Desert Island Discs, a radio 
show broadcast on the BBC since 1942 
(Brown, Cook, and Cottrell 2017; Dean et al. 
2018; Thurman 2012). The format of the show 
is straightforward. Each week a “castaway”—
usually a noteworthy and influential elite person—
is asked to choose eight songs or pieces of 
music they would take with them if they were 
Friedman and Reeves 331
to be stranded on a desert island. As over 60 
percent of the people who have appeared on 
Desert Island Discs are also in Who’s Who, we 
are able to merge the two datasets to provide a 
more granular analysis of the music tastes of 
around 1,200 Who’s Who entrants.
RESULTS
The End of the Aristocratic Era:  
1900 to 1920
Our analysis explores the changing recreations 
of Who’s Who entrants transitioning into adult-
hood between 1850 and 1989. We display 
entrants’ preferences according to the decades 
in which they turned 20, as we know that peo-
ple’s cultural tastes tend to mature and stabilize 
in early adulthood (ter Bogt et al. 2011; Hol-
brook and Schindler 1989; Smith 1994). As we 
will show, we see three major shifts in the con-
tents and dominant mode of elite culture over 
this time period. First, we observe the initial 
ascendancy but swift decline of what we call 
“aristocratic” culture. As Figure 1 shows, early 
entrants show a high propensity for hunting, 
shooting, fishing, sailing, yachting, rowing, 
horse-related activities (e.g., horse riding, horse 
racing, polo, dressage, eventing), and golf. This 
reflects the fact that throughout the nineteenth 
century “[t]he foundations of elite social life 
were firmly laid in the country” (Henry 
2007:320). Dominant groups would congregate 
at the landscaped estates of the landowning 
aristocracy and take part in activities like hunt-
ing, shooting, and fishing (Cannadine 1999). 
These activities were also institutionalized via 
the “Season,”10 a set of regularized events in the 
elite social calendar that dominated the leisure 
time of the aristocracy and the landed gentry 
(Horn 1992; Scott 1991). Participating in the 
Season required vast economic resources and 
therefore throughout most of the nineteenth 
century these economic barriers ensured that 
aristocratic practices remained the preserve of 
the traditional landowning elite.
But, as Figure 1 shows, at the turn of the 
century the dominance of this aristocratic 
culture began to wane. Two processes are 
central in understanding this decline. First, 
American (and to a lesser extent British) 
industrialists, who had amassed fortunes 
often surpassing even the wealthiest land-
owners, gradually began to buy their way into 
high society. They purchased country estates, 
rented townhouses in central London, 
Figure 1. The Ascendancy and Decline of Aristocratic Culture
Note: The top line is the summation of all the activities reported in the figure and all other Aristocratic 
words listed in Part F of the online supplement.
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acquired the libraries and art collections of 
bankrupt aristocrats, and married the children 
of the landed gentry (Rubinstein 1981). Many 
traditional landowners certainly complained 
about these parvenus, dismissing them as 
“social scum and nouveaux riches” (Canna-
dine 1999). Yet they lacked the means to 
prevent their gradual infiltration. For exam-
ple, the proportion of women from outside the 
landowning classes presented at court11 grew 
from 10 percent in 1841 to over 50 percent by 
the end of the nineteenth century, and by 1914 
there were 50 American peeresses,12 up from 
four just a few decades earlier (Cannadine 
1999).
The nouveaux riches entered aristocratic 
social circles in part because of their superior 
wealth. But their ascent was also facilitated by 
a concomitant process of economic decline 
among the British aristocracy. From the 1880s 
onward, a series of economic and social shocks 
weakened the position of the landed elite, leav-
ing them vulnerable to interlopers and making 
it harder for them to participate in the Season 
(Horn 1992). In particular, the cost of labor 
combined with falling agricultural prices left 
many of the great estates bankrupt, forcing 
aristocratic families to sell off large sections of 
their land (Beckett 1986).13 The upwardly 
mobile only deepened this crisis. Very soon 
after the “foreign” invasion, for example, the 
popularity of the Season declined precipitously 
(Scott 1991). The old elite found the extrava-
gance of the arrivistes distasteful, and many 
parvenus found aristocratic practices “rigid” 
and “intolerably stuffy” (Cannadine 1999). A 
reconfiguration of elite social and cultural life 
began to take place, with the social and cul-
tural centers of Britain moving from the coun-
ties to the cities, and London in particular.
The Rise of Highbrow Culture:  
1920 to 1950
At the turn of the twentieth century, at the 
same time as the hold of aristocratic culture 
began to wane, we begin to see in our data the 
increasing importance of “highbrow” cultural 
activities. As Figure 2 illustrates, starting 
around 1920, before slowing down after 
1950, we see a marked increase in prefer-
ences for theater, classical music,14 literature, 
opera, and the arts. Alongside these more 
formal types of cultural participation, we also 
see a greater proclivity for certain outdoor 
recreations, such as hiking.
Particularly influential in understanding this 
shift is a generation born between 1900 and 
1929 who were heavily influenced by the 
Bloomsbury Group, an intellectual collective 
that came to define a new mode of elite culture 
(Annan 1991; Griffiths et al. 2008; Savage 
2010). Many of this new elite cohort were edu-
cated at the same institutions as earlier genera-
tions, such as elite public schools and Oxbridge, 
but they were strongly critical of the “philistin-
ism”15 of leisured aristocratic culture, where one 
“plays cricket, is scratch at golf and has a fine 
seat on a horse” but is also likely to be suspi-
cious of “anyone who knows about art, music or 
literature” (Annan 1991). Instead, they 
embraced a set of emerging high and metropoli-
tan cultural forms—abstract art, theater, and 
ballet—promulgated by prominent Bloomsber-
ries such as Virginia Woolf,16 D. H. Lawrence, 
and Roger Fry. As poet Ezra Pound proclaimed 
in 1918: “the old aristocracies of blood and 
business are about to be supplanted by the aris-
tocracy of the arts” (Rose 2001:435).
What united these new elite cultural prac-
tices was arguably a particular modernist aes-
thetic premised on a “disinterested” privileging 
of artistic form over emotional function (Kant 
[1790] 1987). Highly influential in dissemi-
nating this was the philosopher G. E. Moore 
(1903) and particularly his book Principia 
Ethica. Moore emphasized the importance of 
“beauty” in properly realizing “the good life” 
and came to have a profound influence on the 
Bloomsberries and other tastemakers (Skidel-
sky 2013). However, the Bloomsberries were 
not snobs in the classic exclusionary sense. In 
fact, their vision was that elite culture should 
play a “civilizing” role in society. They 
believed art had the ability to change the 
human character, but to do so, to bring about 
human flourishing, people needed to adopt the 
“right” kind of stance. Under the influence of 
Moore’s work, the Bloomsberries and others 
began to institutionalize this vision. In 
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particular, they had an enormous influence on 
the ethos of a number of emerging cultural 
institutions. For example, one of the most 
prominent Bloomsberries, the economist John 
Maynard Keynes, was the first head of what is 
now known as the Arts Council (the main 
public body responsible for administering 
state funding to the arts). In this role, Keynes 
reduced support for local cultural activities 
and argued stridently that “it was standards 
that mattered” when it came to the state-
sponsored promotion of culture17 (Mulgan 
1996; Skidelsky 2013).
The influence of the Bloomsberries can 
also be seen in the early ethos of the BBC, and 
particularly its first director, John Reith. Reith 
explicitly rejected the lowbrow populism of 
American broadcasting and instead, like 
Keynes, turned his focus to “standards.” He 
aired classical music, theater, poetry,18 and 
elite sports, while shunning football, and 
argued that the BBC’s core mission should be 
to share “all that is best in every department of 
human knowledge, endeavour and achieve-
ment” (Potter 2012:23; see also Mulgan 1996).
This belief in the civilizing force of high 
culture also informed efforts to standardize 
educational curricula. By 1950, for example, 
students were required to pass a humanities 
subject to receive their School Certificate (the 
first generalized, pre-university qualifica-
tion). The humanities had long been valued in 
elite schools, but this formalized and expanded 
the importance of certain subjects, such as 
English literature and art history, and in so 
doing explicitly connected knowledge of high 
culture to educational attainment (Elliott 
2011; Hewison 1995).
One further striking finding emerges from 
this highbrow period. Among Who’s Who 
entrants who turned 20 between 1900 and 
1950, the propensity to report one’s recrea-
tions increased dramatically, from around 40 
percent to about 80 percent of entrants.19 
Clearly, as the institutionalization of high-
brow culture gathered pace, so too did the 
propensity of elites to express their own, 
increasingly highbrow, tastes in public.20
The Decline of Deference and the 
Rise of the Elite Omnivore, 1950 to 
the Present
Although highbrow tastes and recreations 
appear to dominate elite culture in the early to 
middle part of the twentieth century, our data 
Figure 2. The Rise of Highbrow Culture
Note: The top line is the summation of all the activities reported in the figure and all other Highbrow 
words listed in Part F of the online supplement.
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also show an intriguing break in their suprem-
acy in the 1950s and 1960s. Figure 3, for 
example, shows that the proportion of entrants 
who expressed only highbrow recreations 
began to fall in the 1950s.
Historical accounts emphasize several fac-
tors in understanding this decline, including 
shifts within the cultural and creative indus-
tries that initially challenged the disinterested 
aesthetic and later legitimized certain popular 
cultural forms (Bauman 2007; Featherstone 
2007; Lena 2019; Peterson and Kern 1996; 
Regev 1994);21 generational value change that 
precipitated a decline in snobbery and defer-
ence to elites22 (Morgan 2018; Savage et al. 
2015; Sayer 2015); and the emergence of a 
managerial culture where access to a broad 
cultural repertoire functioned as a key man-
agement tool23 (DiMaggio 1987; Lizardo 
2006; Scott 1991). Certainly, the decline coin-
cided with important shifts within many of the 
institutions that had previously been so instru-
mental in generating belief in the supremacy 
of highbrow culture. The BBC, for example, 
and to a lesser extent the Arts Council, began 
to change aesthetic course, increasingly pro-
moting, programming, and funding more pop-
ular cultural content (Hewison 1995).
Yet Figure 3 not only details a move away 
from the dominance of highbrow culture, it 
also shows, from the 1950s onward, a rise in 
preferences for more “popular” cultural 
forms, such as football and cinema, and ordi-
nary or everyday cultural practices, such as 
spending time with family, friends, and pets. 
These ordinary recreations may not be super-
seding more conventional elite pursuits (with 
the exception of relationships, they are not 
challenging highbrow activities in terms of 
popularity), but their significance to our anal-
ysis is rooted more in their integration with 
traditionally dominant modes of elite culture. 
Figure 4, using the semi-automated content 
analysis described in the Methods section, 
shows how emerging modes increasingly 
involved retaining a penchant for more tradi-
tional forms of elite culture and, at the same 
time, combining these with more popular and 
ordinary forms. The British elite, in other 
words, appears to have become increasingly 
omnivorous over the past 50 years.
Unpacking the Elite Omnivore
The question, of course, is what does this 
omnivorousness mean for contemporary 
Figure 3. The Rise of Popular and Everyday Recreations
Note: The top line is the summation of all the activities reported in the figure and all other Popular/
Ordinary words listed in Part F of the online supplement.
Friedman and Reeves 335
debates about elite distinction? Although this 
is difficult to definitively answer with quanti-
tative data, the unique nature of the way rec-
reations are expressed in Who’s Who can 
provide some clues. In particular, many peo-
ple in Who’s Who choose to report their recre-
ations in ways that go beyond simply listing 
types of recreations: they actively “play with 
the form” of their entry, describing their inter-
ests in a knowing, humorous, or slightly 
ironic way. Salient examples include “sailing, 
opera, gardening, perfecting espresso coffee” 
(Professor Azriel Zuckerman, academic), 
“applying Wittgenstein” (Anthony Ash, 
senior civil servant), “tennis, guitar, cycling, 
skipping, herb-surfing, dendron-leaping, por-
tacenare” (Richard Addis, journalist), “loud 
music, strong cider” (Jonathan Ashley-Smith, 
senior civil servant), and simply “[the] usual” 
(Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, Chief of 
Naval Staff). Such entries represent subtle 
acts of distinction, with entrants demonstrat-
ing their aesthetic confidence to knowingly 
play with the form. In Figure 5, using the 
same semi-automated content analysis 
described earlier, we estimate the proportion 
of people in each cohort expressing their rec-
reations in this way over time. Strikingly, 
such playing with form is largely nonexistent 
among entrants who came of age before the 
1950s, but in more recent cohorts it has 
become far more common.
Although significant, this practice is only 
ever evident among a minority of Who’s Who 
entrants; the reporting norm remains whole 
art forms or cultural practices. This makes 
analysis of omnivorousness difficult. Many 
cultural forms, such as music,24 are ambigu-
ous and need further specification to interpret 
in terms of legitimacy. To address this, we 
merge Who’s Who with data from Desert 
Island Discs (described in the Methods sec-
tion) to provide a more granular analysis of 
the music tastes of 1,200 Who’s Who entrants. 
Two findings emerge.
First, we code artists into genres and exam-
ine how the songs played on Desert Island 
Discs changed over time and by birth cohort. 
Figure 4. The Rise of the Elite Omnivore
Note: These estimates were calculated using ReadMe after both authors hand-coded 600 responses. The 
solid black line with hollow circles at the bottom of the graph is the proportion of people who reported 
participating in ambiguous activities, such as gardening. The dashed gray line with + signs measures 
the combination of the aristocratic and the ordinary, but this never really reaches above 10 percent of 
responses.
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This genre-based analysis echoes the trend 
toward omnivorousness shown in Figure 4. 
Specifically, the vast majority of entrants play 
at least one piece of highbrow classical music, 
but the percentage who play classical music 
and tracks from less legitimate genres, such as 
pop, rock, folk, electronic, world, and country, 
grows significantly over time. For example, 
among entrants who turned 20 between 1896 
and 1939, 10 percent combined classical 
music with other genres. In contrast, among 
entrants who turned 20 after the 1960s, over 
40 percent combined tracks from classical and 
more popular genres.
Second, we go further to examine the legiti-
macy of the popular music being played. Spe-
cifically, we examined the critical-acclaim of 
musical artists by analyzing their average score 
on the music website Metacritic, which aggre-
gates reviews of albums. Figure 6 shows that 
the artists played by Who’s Who entrants are 
consistently more legitimate, in terms of their 
mean Metacritic score, than the average musi-
cal artist.25 Indeed, they are consistently in the 
top quartile. This indicates that although con-
temporary elites may be increasingly integrat-
ing popular cultural forms into their cultural 
repertoires, the individual artists they prefer 
still tilt toward the legitimate and consecrated.
The omnivorousness we identify may be 
partly explained by elites adopting tastes for 
more legitimate popular artists. However, it is 
important to recall that many of the non-high-
brow recreations that emerge in Figure 3 are 
not forms of conventional cultural consump-
tion. In fact, most are more ordinary or every-
day forms of cultural participation, such as 
spending time with family, friends, and pets, 
that are not normally considered in debates 
about cultural omnivorousness (Miles and Gib-
son 2017). It is also striking that among the 
most recent entrants to Who’s Who it is these 
everyday recreations that are rising most sig-
nificantly, and much faster than tastes for popu-
lar culture. Figure 7 unpacks this rise to look at 
the role of both cohort and period effects. Two 
patterns emerge. Younger cohorts are far more 
likely than older cohorts to report these every-
day recreations, but such reporting increases 
for all cohorts over time—particularly among 
entrants who were added to Who’s Who after 
2000. This suggests the rising expression of 
these distinctly ordinary recreations is not just 
about the generation in which elites grew up, 
Figure 5. The Rise of Who’s Who Entrants “Playing with Form” in the Recreations Entry
Note: These estimates were calculated using ReadMe after both authors hand-coded 600 responses.
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but also the distinct period in which they enter 
Who’s Who and are asked to present their cul-
tural selves in this very public way. Our results 
thus point to an intriguing period effect in the 
foregrounding of ordinariness that affects all 
entrants to Who’s Who from the 1990s onward.26
Figure 6. The Critical Acclaim of Music Chosen by Who’s Who Entrants Appearing on 
Desert Island Discs
Note: The average Metacritic scores were collected by hand and represent the average rating across all 
of an artist’s albums.
Figure 7. The Rise of Everyday Recreations since 1986
Note: The year Who’s Who entrants were added to the volume is only available for individuals added 
after 1986.
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Limitations and Robustness Checks
It is important to acknowledge that our results 
raise a number of theoretical and method-
ological questions that our data do not allow 
us to fully address. First, we lack systemati-
cally collected data that would allow us to 
compare the recreations of Who’s Who 
entrants to the wider UK population, or to see 
how this relationship may have changed over 
time. This has clear implications for discus-
sions about elite distinction, which rest on 
both the demonstration of class-structured 
differences in lifestyle as well as evidence 
that lower social classes emulate, or recog-
nize the value of, elite tastes.
Although data on cultural consumption in 
the UK before the start of the twenty-first 
century are rare, here we draw on two 
studies—carried out at the beginning (Mass 
Observation 1939) and the end (Young and 
Willmott 1973) of our second “highbrow” 
stage of elite culture—to partially address 
these issues.27 We then compare these early 
analyses with two datasets from our third 
period: Bennett and colleagues’ (2009) mixed-
methods study of class and culture and official 
statistics collected as part of the Taking-Part 
Survey (Reeves 2015). As Figure 8 shows, 
throughout much of the twentieth century 
clear differences exist between the cultural 
preferences of Who’s Who entrants and other 
social class groups. In particular, highbrow 
taste was far more prevalent in Who’s Who 
than in other groups, including even the pro-
fessional middle classes (a finding also con-
firmed by Bennett et al. 2009:251–3).28
The second limitation of our results con-
cerns the possible gap between what elites 
say they do in a public document like Who’s 
Who and what they actually do in practice 
(Jerolmack and Khan 2014). For example, 
Holmqvist’s (2017) ethnographic work con-
firms that elites often publicly emphasize 
investment in friends and family, yet in prac-
tice actually spend less time cultivating such 
relationships, due to busy work schedules and 
reliance on paid childcare. However, we 
should reiterate that our primary focus is not 
so much changes in elite cultural practice but 
changes in elite cultural distinction; in other 
words, how elites deploy their recreations in 
public to signal social position or, in this case, 
moral legitimacy. In this regard, we believe 
the public-facing dimension of Who’s Who 
provides unique insights into the performa-
tive dimension of distinction.
Normally, performative or interactional 
aspects of distinction are thought to be best 
tapped using ethnographic methods (Jerol-
mack and Khan 2014). Yet ethnographic 
observations tend to be rooted in specific sets 
of interactions between particular people 
located in particular settings (see, e.g., Khan 
2011). What distinguishes our data is that 
elites are communicating their cultural tastes 
not to specific interlocutors, with all the con-
textual idiosyncrasies that flank such interac-
tions, but to an audience of generalized others. 
This context, we argue, provides an important 
vantage point from which to understand elite 
distinction as a communicative process. Spe-
cifically, it may compel elites to foreground 
their “honorable” (Pugh 2013) cultural selves, 
that is, to curate their recreations in such a 
way that presents them in an admirable light 
or “which incorporate and exemplify the offi-
cial accredited values” (Goffman 1959:19).29
A third limitation of our analysis is that its 
focus on all entrants runs the risk of masking 
recreational heterogeneity within the British 
elite. Yet, as we explore in Part I of the online 
supplement, there is a surprising degree of 
homogeneity across potentially important sub-
samples. For example, we find only very small 
differences in cultural practice between indi-
viduals who enter Who’s Who by virtue of their 
position and those who enter through the selec-
tion panel, or between those who attended an 
elite private school and those who did not. 
There are, however, potentially important dif-
ferences by occupation. For example, mem-
bers of the military are consistently more likely 
to participate in aristocratic practices, whereas 
people from the cultural industries are much 
more likely to participate in highbrow activi-
ties. Importantly, however, although there are 
occupational differences in the popularity of 
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cultural modes, the patterns of change between 
these modes are similar across all fields. 
Finally, we also see important differences 
between men and women. Women in earlier 
cohorts were far less likely to participate in 
aristocratic activities but were far more likely 
to participate in highbrow activities. Men 
eventually catch up with women, but this sug-
gests women may have acted as first-movers in 
terms of the highbrow mode.30
These distinct patterns of cultural practice 
among certain social groups suggest that the 
rise and fall of different modes of elite culture 
may be connected to changes in the social 
composition of Who’s Who. We examine this in 
Part J of the online supplement. First, we con-
ducted a matching analysis, using coarsened 
exact matching, to identify a subset of people 
in Who’s Who that possess a similar set of char-
acteristics across different cohorts; we then 
reweighted these matched groups to smooth 
differences in the size of the groups over time. 
Following the patterns of heterogeneity men-
tioned earlier, we matched on gender, social 
origin occupation, selection type, and a range 
of other variables (for more details, see Part J 
of the online supplement). Second, we con-
ducted a counterfactual analysis that focuses 
more precisely on changes in occupational 
structure by estimating what the recreations of 
those in Who’s Who would have been had the 
amount of entrants from different occupational 
fields remained unchanged (see Part C of the 
online supplement). Reassuringly, both the 
matching and counterfactual analyses indicate 
that accounting for changes in the composition 
of Who’s Who over time leads to only very 
minor differences in our results.
Finally, Who’s Who only details entrants’ 
recreations in the last year they provided data, 
and therefore it may neglect changes in taste 
that occurred over the life course. To partially 
address this uncertainty, we explore the 
degree to which recreation entries changed 
Figure 8. Elite Highbrow Consumption Compared to Other Social Class Groups
Note: The solid line is taken from Figure 2 and captures the proportion of people in Who’s Who who 
reported participating in highbrow culture. The dark gray lines are the proportion of people in each 
social class/cohort combination in the 1970 London survey (n = 1,928) conducted by Young and 
Willmott that reported their “best” recreation activity as something highbrow (e.g., theater, painting, 
or sculpture). The light gray lines are the proportion of people in each social class/cohort combination 
in the 2005 Taking-Part Survey (n = 28,117) conducted by the Arts Council that reported consuming 
highbrow activities (e.g., art exhibitions, theater, opera).
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over time by hand-coding the recreations data 
for 1,761 records that were included in both 
the 1988 and 2016 versions of Who’s Who. As 
shown in Part K of the online supplement, 
there is little change in the recreations 
reported by individuals over time, suggesting 
tastes largely stabilize by this point in the life 
course, and so any bias introduced by this 
aspect of the data is negligible.31
DISCUSSION
In this study, we have used a combination of 
dictionary methods and computational text 
analysis to examine patterns of elite cultural 
consumption over time. These methods are 
not unusual in sociology, but they have only 
rarely been used to analyze historical sources 
containing unstructured text. In this way, we 
hope our analysis may act as a blueprint for 
researchers interested in interrogating the 
multitude of other unstructured historical 
documents where elites may have left distinct 
textual traces (Khan 2012b). We believe such 
methodological tools may also be useful to 
cultural consumption scholars, who have 
hitherto largely relied on survey or interview 
data to uncover patterns of practice. Here we 
hope our use of Who’s Who illustrates the 
gains that flow from investigating more fine-
grained sources that are now more accessible 
in the digital era. Not only can such sources 
help fill empirical gaps in our understanding 
of the tastes of specific groups, such as elites, 
but they may also begin to shed light, as we 
do here, on the elusive but pivotal “display” 
dimensions of cultural distinction.
Our results reveal three distinct stages of 
elite culture in the UK over the past 120 
years. First, we see a dominant mode of aris-
tocratic practice forged around the leisure 
possibilities afforded by landed estates (e.g., 
shooting, hunting, horse riding, polo, sailing), 
but which waned significantly in the late 
nineteenth century. Second, we find a high-
brow culture dominated by the fine arts 
(opera, classical music, theater, literature) 
that increased sharply in the early twentieth 
century before beginning to gently recede in 
the most recent cohorts. Third, we find a con-
temporary mode increasingly characterized 
by the blending of aristocratic and particu-
larly highbrow pursuits with more everyday 
forms of cultural participation. These shifts 
not only suggest important changes in the 
nature and content of elite culture but they 
also chart, as we go on to argue here, impor-
tant shifts in the nature of elite distinction.
Why History Matters for Elite 
Distinction
Two theoretical concepts dominate sociologi-
cal analysis of elite distinction: emulation and 
(mis)recognition. In this article, rather than 
adjudicate between these approaches, we 
show that both have operated in the UK con-
text. To understand this we argue that history 
is key. Although both concepts were pur-
ported, by their architects Veblen and Bour-
dieu, to transcend time and space, our analysis 
indicates that their capacity to explain the 
sociological significance of elite recreations 
in a UK context depends very clearly on the 
temporal period being examined.
At the end of the nineteenth century, when 
our analysis begins, elites exercised distinction 
via the practice of an overtly aristocratic mode. 
Key to this was the scarcity of such recrea-
tions, whereby strong economic barriers to 
entry endowed activities like hunting or polo 
with a sense of rarity that set elites apart and 
acted as grounds on which they enacted social 
closure. At the same time, notions of ascribed 
class position prevailed in Britain, with the 
aristocratic elite enjoying a widespread, 
although not complete, deference in the eyes of 
other social groups32 (Cannadine 1999; Scott 
1991). Entry to elite circles in the first period 
of our analysis, then, largely rested on what 
Veblen called “pecuniary emulation,” that is, 
one’s economic capacity to take part in, and 
ape, the cultural practices of existing elites. Yet 
this model of elite distinction, premised on 
exclusivity and deference, was threatened by 
the wide-scale influx of nouveau riche indus-
trialists at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Many traditional landowners resented these 
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parvenus, but there was no formal way to 
exclude them. Economic capital was the only 
real barrier to entry, and with the landed estates 
increasingly struggling economically, the old 
aristocratic elite lacked the economic means to 
enact the kind of “invidious distinction” docu-
mented by Veblen in the nineteenth-century 
United States.
What followed this decline was not just a 
new elite culture but also a new mode of elite 
distinction. To understand the strong rise in 
preferences for high culture in the early twenti-
eth century, it is thus imperative to consider the 
processes of legitimation, institutionalization, 
and ultimately (mis)recognition that flanked 
the adoption of this highbrow mode (Levine 
1988). This is not to say there was not some 
(mis)recognition of aristocratic culture, or that 
highbrow culture did not feature at all in the 
lifestyles of earlier elites. But what is distinct 
about this period were the concerted efforts of 
a distinct set of elites, operating in the fields of 
politics, education, and the cultural industries, 
who not only acted as early adopters and first 
movers33 in relation to this new, more joined-
up, highbrow cultural repertoire but were also 
central in institutionalizing its value,34 estab-
lishing the Arts Council (Upchurch 2004),35 
consecrating high culture through the education 
system,36 and acting as tastemaking cultural 
intermediaries37—critics, journalists, publish-
ers, scouts, agents, marketers, and so on—
invested with the ability, through newspaper 
reviews and awards, to control the public dis-
course on culture (English 2008).38
The point to underline here is that together 
these agents of legitimation were successful 
in producing an unprecedented (mis)recogni-
tion of the inherent value of highbrow elite 
culture.39 It is also telling that this move 
toward a distinctly highbrow elite culture 
dovetailed with a marked increase in the pro-
clivity of elites to report their recreations in 
Who’s Who. As the legitimacy of elite culture 
grew, it became more important to the way 
elites presented their biographies in public.
By combining our results with a range of 
historical sources it is therefore possible to dis-
cern elite distinction based on both emulation 
and (mis)recognition at different points in 
recent British history. It is also worth noting 
that the periods in which each of these models 
dominated coincide with the periods in which 
Veblen and Bourdieu staged their own inter-
ventions. In this way, our analysis not only 
underlines the importance of history for under-
standing elite distinction, but it more broadly 
stresses the importance of considering the his-
torical context from which theoretical concepts 
emerge.
Toward a Contemporary Theory  
of “Ordinary” Elite Distinction
Although we find evidence of both emulation 
and (mis)recognition at different points in the 
twentieth century, which is more useful for 
understanding the contemporary recreations 
of the British elite? Here we would begin by 
acknowledging that we detect at least a resi-
due of both theoretical modes today. For 
example, aristocratic recreations continue to 
be practiced by nearly 40 percent of current 
Who’s Who entrants (see Figure 1), and an 
enduring nostalgia and reverence for the lei-
sured aristocracy, and the attendant “gentry 
aesthetic,” remains strong in sections of the 
British population (Smith 2016).
Having said this, we would argue that 
(mis)recognition remains the more useful of 
the two models for understanding contempo-
rary modes of elite distinction. At first glance 
this may seem at odds with our findings, par-
ticularly the gentle decline in highbrow rec-
reations we observe among individuals 
coming of age from the 1950s onward, and 
the concomitant rise in more popular and 
everyday forms of cultural participation. This 
of course connects strongly with a wider lit-
erature on the rise of the “cultural omnivore” 
(Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Sim-
kus 1992) and the argument that such eclecti-
cism threatens Bourdieusian processes of 
(mis)recognition (Chan 2019; Erickson 1996; 
Warde and Gayo-Cal 2009).
Yet many other scholars have refuted that 
the cultural omnivore is constitutive of a plu-
ralist shift in cultural consumption. As Lizardo 
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and Skiles (2012) forcefully argue, omnivo-
rous consumption of popular culture is entirely 
compatible with a Bourdieusian framework, as 
in most cases the actual mode of consumption 
simply represents the transposability of the 
aesthetic disposition to cultural objects not 
originally produced with an aesthetic intention 
(see also Jarness 2015), or a highly selective 
consumption of “quality” popular culture 
(Bauman 2007; Entwistle and Rocamora 2006; 
Johnston and Baumann 2009; Kuipers 2015; 
Regev 1994; Skeggs et al. 2008).
One theme that emerges from this litera-
ture, however, is that the aesthetic mode of 
cultural distinction may be changing. Whereas 
the traditional aesthetic disposition—notably 
through the model of the Kantian aesthetic—
celebrates withdrawal, distance, and discern-
ment, and classically places audiences in a 
relatively passive and distant position, emerg-
ing modes of consuming popular culture often 
use a more performative, knowing expression 
of cultural aptitude—an aesthetic of engage-
ment, exhibition, and ease rather than absorp-
tion and introspection (Hanquinet et al. 2014). 
(Mis)recognition, in other words, may still be 
taking place, but it now rests on conceptions 
of legitimacy that have been extended to 
many popular cultural objects and artists, and 
new “ways of seeing.”
Our results compel us more toward this 
interpretation. In particular, we see the appar-
ent omnivorousness of elites not so much as 
evidence of the dissolution of cultural bound-
aries but of two quite different processes. 
First, we see evidence of the kind of “know-
ing” orientation to culture. As Figure 5 shows, 
we see a marked increase in the number of 
entrants “playing with the form” of the rec-
reations’ entry, using humor and wordplay. 
This may partly reflect broader cultural shifts 
toward self-expression and individualism 
(Buchmann and Eisner 1997; De Keere 2014), 
but we read it more as an example of the 
transposal of the aesthetic disposition—a 
self-conscious and knowing attempt to dis-
tance oneself from highbrow modes of 
distinction-signaling, yet still conducted to 
showcase a certain aesthetic ease (Khan 
2011). Second, we find that legitimacy still 
plays an important role in understanding the 
popular preferences of elites. By connecting 
Who’s Who entrants to their more granular 
musical preferences, as expressed on Desert 
Island Discs, we see that their tastes are sig-
nificantly more consecrated than the average 
pop artist. This suggests further support for 
the argument that contemporary elites con-
tinue to pursue distinction via careful expres-
sion of the “right” cultural tastes.
Yet although we interpret contemporary 
British elites as distinction-seeking, we also 
follow the recent work of Hahl and col-
leagues (2017) in arguing that contemporary 
expressions of elite cultural identity fulfill 
another function: authenticity-seeking. Hahl 
and colleagues make this argument in relation 
to elite cultural tastes that are not necessarily 
legitimate but are considered to be produced 
with an intrinsic, and therefore authentic, 
motivation. We extend this beyond popular 
culture to show its relevance to a wider set of 
everyday cultural preferences—most notably 
spending time with friends, family, and pets. 
Such everyday cultural participation is almost 
always absent from cultural consumption sur-
vey data, yet as illustrated in Sherman’s 
(2017) ethnographic work, it is pivotal to 
provide a richer, more complete understand-
ing of elite lifestyles (or, in this case, how 
elites wish to present them in public).
The everyday recreations we identify here 
also share important properties with the popu-
lar culture analyzed by Hahl and colleagues 
(2017). In particular, they are activities widely 
perceived to be prosocial, pursued for intrin-
sic rather than extrinsic rewards, and not 
associated with the highbrow aesthetics syn-
onymous with Bourdieusian processes of 
(mis)recognition. We thus argue that elites’ 
increasing proclivity to register these every-
day recreations in public represents another 
means through which they seek to establish 
their authenticity, normality, and ordinariness 
(Savage et al. 2015; Sherman 2018), and 
ward off moral suspicions that their highbrow 
or aristocratic tastes may position them as 
snobbish, status-seeking, and aloof.40
Friedman and Reeves 343
We would thus summarize the contempo-
rary mode of “ordinary elite distinction” in the 
following way. First, it relies on the public 
display of some cultural forms, objects, artists, 
or recreations that are (mis)recognized as 
legitimate. However, such legitimate prefer-
ences are rarely articulated in isolation. In fact, 
they are knowingly positioned alongside more 
everyday cultural practices that are largely 
unrelated to hierarchies of legitimacy. This 
combination, however, is distinct from domi-
nant interpretations of cultural omnivorous-
ness, which tend to posit such blending as 
indicating either a dissolution of cultural 
boundaries or the transposal of the aesthetic 
disposition. Instead, we argue that the expres-
sion of everyday cultural preferences performs 
an important signaling function for elites. This 
is partly, as Hahl and colleagues (2017), Ljun-
ggren (2017), and Sherman (2017) note, about 
establishing individual moral worth and plug-
ging an authenticity-insecurity that elites feel 
vis a vis the wider public. Yet we would extend 
this to argue that the pursuit of such authentic-
ity is still ultimately connected to securing 
distinction. As many studies demonstrate, non-
elites, and working-class groups in particular, 
often distinguish between elites whom they see 
as “decent” and “accommodating towards oth-
ers” and elites they see as “snobbish” and 
“look down on others,” with the former clearly 
valued over the latter (Friedman 2014; Jarness 
2015; McKenzie 2015).
It is thus not so much that elites are viewed 
with suspicion because they are elite; rather, 
it is their perceived smugness, elitism, and 
contemptuousness that rouses negative reac-
tions. In this way, it is possible to see the 
public expression of everyday preferences as 
a means of accentuating cultural connection 
and ordinariness while retaining the cultural 
differences traditionally tied to elite distinc-
tion. In other words, the careful manufacture 
of ordinary self-presentation is effective in 
securing distinction because it means actual 
cultural boundaries between elites and 
others—as well as the potential privileges and 
advantages that accrue from practicing life-
styles that continue to be (mis)recognized as 
legitimate—are not questioned, as individuals 
in lower class positions no longer see the 
highbrow elements of the elite taste palette as 
status-seeking (Jarness and Friedman 2017). 
This is what Bourdieu (1991:68) called “strat-
egies of condescension”: in downplaying dif-
ference, elites can “derive profit from the 
objective relations of power” in the very act 
of obfuscating the relation.
One additional point is worth making. Our 
analysis indicates that the rise of ordinary 
elite distinction—marked by the twin pursuits 
of distinction and ordinariness—is most clear 
cut from the 1990s onward. This coincides 
neatly with the pulling away of the top 1 per-
cent of the income distribution in Britain, 
which continued to rise following the more 
general increase in inequality through the 
1980s (Piketty 2014). Of course, this is only 
an association and it is unlikely that all 
entrants in Who’s Who are members of the 1 
percent. Yet we would speculate that these 
patterns may be plausibly connected. Put sim-
ply, as elites have pulled away economically 
from other social groups, there is evidence 
that they have become increasingly insecure 
about their moral legitimacy, and increasingly 
sensitive to public concern that they are only 
motivated by extrinsic rewards (Hecht 2017; 
Sherman 2018). In this context, the connota-
tions of ordinariness that accompany prac-
tices such as spending time with family, 
friends, and pets may act as an effective 
means to shore up moral legitimacy and sig-
nal authenticity in an era of rising inequality.
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Notes
 1. Recent quantitative archival analyses by Accomi-
notti, Khan, and Storer (2018) and Hoffman 
(2019) have fruitfully addressed issues of cultural 
consumption, although each are limited to just 
one arena of consumption—opera and literature, 
respectively. Similarly, Majima and Warde (2008) 
look at elite consumption in Britain, but their data 
restricted their ability to examine patterns of cul-
tural taste or cultural participation.
 2. There are some significant differences in how these 
authors viewed social emulation. For example, 
Simmel argued that new fashions do not necessarily 
emanate from elites but can spring from certain sec-
tions of the middle classes.
 3. Part A of the online supplement includes an image 
of a typical Who’s Who entry, including a recre-
ations section.
 4. Who’s Who also includes hereditary members of the 
aristocracy (Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, 
and Baronets).
 5. In certain countries, including the United States, 
there are long-standing concerns that some entrants 
pay for inclusion in Who’s Who (Carlson 1999).
 6. Who’s Who is widely used as a noun denoting “a 
group of the most important people involved in a 
particular subject or activity.” In the Merriam- 
Webster Dictionary, the most prominent synonym 
for the term is “elite” (http://www.merriam-web 
ster.com/dictionary/who’s%20who).
 7. The size of Who’s Who, relative to the UK popu-
lation, has remained remarkably stable over time. 
The 1905 edition of Who’s Who had around 16,500 
entrants, accounting for about .04 percent of the UK 
population. Who’s Who has expanded in size over 
this period, but it still only constitutes about .05 per-
cent of the UK population.
 8. Nearly 80 percent of current entrants report their 
recreations but, as discussed in the Results section, 
this has increased significantly over time. The aver-
age age that individuals are included in Who’s Who 
is 50, but this is only available for the past 30 years.
 9. It is conceivable that our results could be affected 
by changes in the meaning of the word “recreation” 
over time. However, as Part E of the online supple-
ment explores, we find only subtle changes in dic-
tionary definitions of the term over time.
10. The Season began in May with the Royal Military 
Tournament (shooting) and continued with the 
Epsom Derby (horse racing), Ascot (horse racing), 
and the Fourth of June events at Eton (Cricket). 
In July, there would be Polo at Hurlingham and 
the Henley Regatta. From August onward, events 
would move toward the country, with hunting 
becoming the focus until the Oxford-Cambridge 
boat race (Scott 1991).
11. Young women were presented at court when they 
reached what was commonly regarded as mar-
riageable age. Only those young women who were 
nominated by someone who had previously kissed 
the hand of the King/Queen were eligible, and this 
occurred when you were presented at court. Nomi-
nation was not enough, however, you also had to 
be regarded as “pure,” and this reflected the social 
status of the nominee (MacCarthy 2006).
12. A peeress is the wife of a peer and therefore a wife 
of a member of the House of Lords (Scott 1991).
13. Between 1876 and 1976, for example, Lord Lecon-
field sold off 90 percent of his 110,000 acres, and 
the Earl of Carlisle was left with only 3,000 acres, 
after previously owning nearly 80,000. These are 
not anomalies, according to Cannadine (1999). 
Almost all Britain’s major families suffered under 
the same economic pressures.
14. Although music is largely expressed as a generic 
preference in Who’s Who, follow-up analyses of 
music taste in Desert Island Discs (as we will detail) 
reveal that, in this period, entrants’ music tastes were 
overwhelmingly dominated by classical music.
15. This was often expressed in terms of a disdain for 
middlebrow culture, which was generally (at least 
implicitly) connected to the nouveau riche. As Vir-
ginia Woolf (1942:199) said, the middlebrow pursues 
“rather nastily . . . money, fame, power or prestige.”
16. Virginia Woolf (1942:196–97) outlined the strati-
fication of “brows.” At the top is the “highbrow,” 
“he is a man or woman of thoroughbred intelligence 
who rides his mind at a gallop across country in pur-
suit of an idea.” At the bottom, conversely, “low-
brow is of course a man or woman of thoroughbred 
vitality who rides his body in pursuit of a living at a 
gallop across life.”
17. As a later Chairman of the Arts Council, Lord 
Goodman, remarked, “a dose of culture could turn 
hooligans into citizens” (Mulgan 1996:207).
18. Key here was the BBC’s Third Programme (1946 to 
1967), which broadcast for six hours every evening 
on BBC Radio and was dedicated to disseminating 
the highbrow arts (Annan 1991; Rose 2001).
19. This rise is not merely an artefact of the changing 
composition of Who’s Who. As explained in Part H of 
the online supplement, a detailed matching analysis 
comparing people born in different periods but who 
were otherwise similar (i.e., they were the same sex, 
attended the same school and university, came from 
similar family backgrounds, and worked in the same 
field) still shows a significant difference in likelihood 
to volunteer recreational information over time.
20. This trend is illustrated in Part H of the online sup-
plement.
21. Postmodern, pop art, and, in a British context, social 
realist movements began to question disinterested-
ness, instead championing a more playful or socially 
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engaged aesthetic (Featherstone 2007; Hanquinet et 
al. 2014; Huyssen 1986; Lena 2019). At the same 
time, the legitimacy of previously lowbrow art 
forms such as cinema and rock music began to grow. 
Emerging cultural intermediaries worked to define 
and consecrate objects and artists and establish an 
intellectualizing discourse that allowed emerging 
generations of elites to adopt an aestheticized appre-
ciation (Bauman 2007; Lena 2019; Regev 1994).
22. The Nazi brutalities of WWII initiated a widespread 
reappraisal of multiple forms of group prejudice, 
and in this context the classist connotations of high-
brow cultural snobbery became increasingly taboo 
(Hewison 1995; Morgan 2018; Savage et al. 2015; 
Sayer 2015). New generations of elites were keen 
to differentiate themselves from the elitism and 
prejudice of their parents’ generation and instead 
espoused, at least in public, a more inclusive cul-
tural ethos (Lena 2019). There was also a broader 
opening up of class boundaries, with significant 
increases in cross-class marriages (Henz and Mills 
2018), absolute upward mobility (Goldthorpe 
1987), and access to elite occupations (Heath 1981).
23. The post-war period saw the rise of large bureaucratic 
organizations across the public and private sectors 
(Freeguard et al. 2017). Who’s Who entrants coming 
of age in the 1950s and 1960s increasingly reached 
elite positions by rising up the managerial ranks, 
rather than via the accelerated old-boy pathways 
associated with earlier periods (Scott 1991). Such 
middle-managerial roles required new skills, particu-
larly the capacity to build relationships with staff at 
different rungs of the organizational hierarchy. In this 
context, a more omnivorous taste palette functioned 
as an important management tool. Highbrow tastes 
may aid and strengthen relationships with senior 
staff, who are often from privileged backgrounds, 
but popular tastes provide an important interactional 
device—“fodder for least common denominator talk” 
(DiMaggio 1987)—for making “bridging” social ties 
with lower-tier staff from less privileged backgrounds 
(Erickson 1996; Lizardo 2006).
24. Other notably polysemic terms include “reading” 
and “television.”
25. There are limitations of using Metacritic to judge 
critical legitimacy. The aggregation of reviews is 
only available for reviews posted online, and this 
influences scores in various ways. First, it means 
we likely underestimate the critical legitimacy of 
many artists, such as the Beatles and Bob Dylan, 
whose earlier acclaimed albums do not have a 
score. Instead, these artists’ scores are based on 
their more recent albums, which are often reviewed 
less favorably. Second, Metacritic only allows us to 
see the critical legitimacy of artists in the present 
rather than their legitimacy when entrants on Des-
ert Island Discs were playing their works. This may 
upwardly bias artists who experienced a significant 
lag between releasing early albums and receiving 
acclaim for them (e.g., Radiohead, Velvet Under-
ground, and The Stone Roses). However, this con-
cern is mitigated by the absence of Metacritic scores 
for most such earlier albums. In short, although 
Metacritic may not be an ideal source for assess-
ing the temporality of critical legitimacy, it likely 
provides a conservative estimate of the legitimacy 
of artists played on Desert Island Discs.
26. Significantly, this trend does not appear to reflect 
wider shifts in the UK. For example, time-use 
research conducted in Britain over a similar period 
illustrates that UK residents are generally not 
spending more time with friends and family than in 
the past (Gershuny and Sullivan 2019).
27. The first study, carried out by the social research 
organization Mass Observation in 1939, asked 379 
respondents a series of open-ended questions about 
class, including their views on their own and others’ 
recreations (Hinton 2008). The second study was 
part of Young and Willmott’s (1973) classic analy-
sis of “The Symmetrical Family.”
28. The qualitative components of Mass Observation’s 
and Bennett and colleagues’ studies also reveal an 
interesting shift in attitudes. For example, Hinton 
(2008) demonstrates that in 1939 a clear reverence 
for highbrow culture pervaded narratives across 
the class spectrum. By 2005, such popular belief in 
the value of highbrow culture had clearly declined 
substantially. Bennett and colleagues’ (2009:252–3) 
interviews indicate that familiarity with high culture 
is still strongly valued by the upper-middle classes, 
but they argue that it is “not obviously recognised 
elsewhere.”
29. There remain limits to our understanding of how 
elites curate their cultural identities in public. For 
example, it is impossible to know the demographic 
coordinates of the audience for Who’s Who. Simi-
larly, our results also raise questions about what 
aspects of cultural identity may be withheld in such 
public declarations, particularly the more visceral 
sentiments of judgment that elites often express in 
less public settings (Jarness and Friedman 2017; 
Pugh 2013).
30. These results should be viewed with some caution, 
however, because the women included in this ear-
lier period were often skewed to particular occu-
pational fields, such as literature, and may not be 
representative of other elite women in the period 
whose occupational positions would later guarantee 
entry.
31. It is also worth acknowledging that the semi-auto-
mated method used to estimate the proportion of 
entrants who play with the form may contain some 
measurement error. The algorithmic procedures 
underlying these estimates are, unsurprisingly, 
limited in their capacity to capture the subtleties of 
irony and humor.
32. Although we do not have primary empirical data 
demonstrating that lower social groups emulated 
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elite culture, it is a reoccurring theme in a range 
of historical sources (Annan 1991; Cannadine 
1999; McKibbin 2000; Scott 1991). Note, too, that 
notions of deference were augmented by tabloid 
media preoccupations with documenting and glam-
orizing “the Season” (McKibbin 2000).
33. If the rise of cultural institutions, such as the BBC, 
school curricula, universities, and the Arts Council, 
were crucial in the dissemination of this new high-
brow mode, we would expect there to be especially 
high levels of highbrow practice among individuals 
working in the education and culture sectors. This 
is what we see in Part L of the online supplement. 
These “cultural leaders” have a much higher like-
lihood of expressing highbrow preferences and, at 
least to some extent, acted as early adopters. For 
example, individuals born in the 1880s and 1890s 
(like Keynes, born 1883) adopted highbrow prac-
tices much more rapidly than other elites, who sub-
sequently responded by following suit in later 1890 
to 1920 cohorts.
34. Ideas about the curative power of high culture were 
more actively institutionalized during this period, 
but they already had a long history, dating back to 
the creation of the British Museum and the 1845 
Libraries Act.
35. As Mulgan (1996:197) notes, the aim for architects 
of cultural policy in the 1930s and 1940s was to 
“wean the public away” from popular culture and 
“widen their horizons” through high culture.
36. Here arts and humanities subjects, such as English 
literature, music, drama, and art history, not only 
promoted high-art forms to the general population, 
but they more generally encouraged students to use 
the critical aesthetic lens of disinterestedness.
37. The art critic, Roger Fry, for example, was a key 
tastemaker. In 1910, Fry organized an exhibition 
titled “Manet and the Post-Impressionists,” bring-
ing together Gauguin, Manet, Matisse, and Van 
Gogh (Annan 1991). So important was the exhibi-
tion that Virginia Woolf later proclaimed: “On or 
about December 1910 human character changed.”
38. In Part M of the online supplement, we explore the 
articles in the review sections of major British news-
papers (i.e., Financial Times, The Times, The Econo-
mist, and the Telegraph) over time, and the proportion 
of these articles that cover highbrow culture (e.g., the-
ater, opera) and popular culture (e.g., comedy, tele-
vision). The size of review sections increases fairly 
steadily throughout the twentieth century, except dur-
ing WWI and WWII, but the cultural forms covered 
changes. Initially, the review section is dominated by 
highbrow culture, but from the 1950s forward we see 
the rise of more popular forms (Purhonen et al. 2018). 
These data broadly reflect the general trend we see in 
the Who’s Who data.
39. See note 28 and Hinton (2008), which demonstrates 
a clear reverence for highbrow culture pervaded 
narratives across the class spectrum in 1939.
40. Sherman (2017:92–96) terms this the “cultural logic 
of legitimate entitlement,” that is, elites downplay 
ostentatious public displays of eliteness and instead 
emphasize investment in family and domesticity to 
establish a connection to the ordinary and normal 
habits of the middle-class.
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